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Population growth and increasing living standards are
doubtless causing water, the number one natural resource,
to become more and more scarce. The reports on an im-
pending extreme water scarcity are, however, often exag-
gerated.
Even arid countries have more than enough water to
cover urban and industrial water consumption
Worldwide 70 % of water consumption is accounted for
by irrigated agriculture, 20 % by industry, and only about
10 % by households. In developing countries with an arid
climate the share demanded by irrigated agriculture is up
to 90 % and more. Disregarding irrigated agriculture, we
find that even the countries of the world poorest in terms
of water resources have sufficient water. Prosperous
countries in arid regions that provide incentives to save
water consume not more than 100 m3 of water per capita
and year (households and industry together). Leaving the
needs of irrigated agriculture out of consideration, the
water available even in the driest countries is sufficient to
supply a rapidly growing population with water. For in-
stance, Jordan, one of the world's five most arid countries,
has an annual average of some 800 million m3 of renew-
able water resources for four million people, i.e. 200 m3
per capita and year and thus twice as much as is needed
for industrial and municipal uses.
In arid regions agricultural policy has a major influ-
ence on water consumption
In arid regions agricultural policy has a pronounced influ-
ence on water demand: a country with an arid climate
aiming for a high level of self-sufficiency in food produc-
tion may expand irrigated agriculture. But typically some
1,000 m3 of water per capita and year are needed for self-
sufficiency, ten times more than needed for municipal and
industrial use. Often the incentives provided to expand
irrigated agriculture include subsidized water
supplies or import barriers (tariffs, quotas, or import
bans). In developing countries low water prices and agri-
cultural protectionism are encountered side by side. In
Saudi-Arabia, for instance, the government long paid five
times the world-market price for wheat. Desert cultivation
devoured 2,000 liters of nonrenewable groundwater per
kg of wheat produced. Subsidized irrigation tariffs are
widespread throughout the world and can be encountered
in industrialized countries like the US as well as in South-
ern Europe.
The world food trade is already providing a crucial
contribution to diminishing regional water scarcity
The Middle East is today one of the world's biggest wheat
importers. If the amount of wheat presently imported into
the region were cultivated there, the additional water
required would be roughly equivalent to the amount of
water borne by the entire Nile. Since this quantity of water
is just not available, without world trade the Middle East
would decades ago already have experienced an unprece-
dented water crisis and famine.
Yet most countries of the world cling to the goal of
national self-sufficiency in staple foods
They cover their food needs largely from what they them-
selves produce. The world trade in grain accounts for only
5 % of world grain production. Various arguments are
cited to justify the goal of self-sufficiency. In the long run
many countries fear that they will not have access to sta-
ple foods in the world market at today's prices, anticipat-
ing instead grain prices rising over the long term, even
though current model calculations today indicate falling
prices. Moreover, some countries do not rule out the pos-
sibility that, under altered political conditions, an embargo
might be imposed against them, not unlike the current
embargo against Iraq. Even if grain imports were allowed
on humanitarian grounds, the countries concerned fear
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Due to population growth, water is reported to be becoming increasingly scarce throughout the world. Some 1.3 billion
people are without access to clean water, and in some regions "water wars" are already threatening. These reports are
well known - but are they also true? The present paper will argue that it is not global water scarcity but policy failure
and misallocation of resources that are responsible for the inadequate access to drinking water:
• Many countries are aiming for national self-sufficiency in staple foods. Some countries in arid areas are subsidiz-
ing the expansion of irrigated agriculture, which accounts for roughly 70 % of the world's water consumption.
• In the cities a good share of water is lost from the water-supply network, and supply failures often occur because
public water utilities, which are often poorly managed, are at the end of their financial tether.
• Many residents of urban slums are not connected to the water-supply network and are thus forced to pay prices to
water vendors that are far higher than the subsidized drinking-water tariffs.
• "Water wars" are for the most part not genuine conflicts over scarce water but a symptom of deeply rooted his-
torical and political conflicts, while water scarcity presents the occasion, or at best a catalyst, for additional ten-
sions.
2that an embargo would deprive them of the possibility to
earn the foreign exchange needed to import grain. Many
countries are for these reasons not prepared to abandon
the goal of national self-sufficiency in staple foods. It
must hence realistically be assumed that in the future
world trade in grain - and its potential for easing regional
water scarcity - will remain limited.
Still, in many arid regions there is hardly any alternative
to higher food imports. In many cases expanding irriga-
tion can be achieved only by overstraining groundwater
reserves (as e.g. in Libya and Saudi-Arabia), by gradually
draining wetlands (as in the Nile Delta and in the Shat el-
Arab), or at the expense of downstream riparians (as in
the case of Turkey vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq).
Today many large dams in developing countries are
being built without any donor participation
Despite extreme water scarcity some countries have, at
least in part of their territory, sufficient water resources to
expand irrigated agriculture. This often requires the con-
struction of long-distance water conduits or dams with an
eye to closing the substantial gap between the spatial and
temporal availability of water in these countries.
Large dams are complex projects that entail a variety of
positive and negative impacts. In the North they are often
seen as symbols of a failed development path banking on
growth and rapid industrialization by means of large-scale
projects. Today information on the detrimental effects of
large dams on the environment as well as the resettlement
necessitated by them are common knowledge. There is
hardly a critical observer who, in discussing the Aswan
dam project, fails to deplore the loss of the allegedly so
fertile Nile silt and the spread of bilharziosis. In fact, Nile
silt has a limited nutrient value, and the yield achieved is
much lower than from soils where mineral fertilizer is
applied; in recent years bilharziosis has declined thanks to
improved hygiene and control of the vector responsible
for its spread.
In some developing countries non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) are voicing severe criticism of large
dams, though independent scientists and government
officials more often offer a positive assessment: in Egypt
it is above all flood protection and the additional em-
ployment of millions of persons in agriculture that are
underscored, together with power generation. Thanks to
these benefits the Aswan Dam, completed in 1970, has, it
is claimed, paid its own way many times over. Occasion-
ally developing countries note critically that countries like
the US built large dams in the first half of the present
century, but are now seeking to deny the same right to the
up-and-coming developing countries. China, India, and
Turkey are today financing large dams without the support
of international donors. The differences of opinion in-
volved were so great as to obstruct the emergence of a
consensus. Now these projects are being implemented
without sufficient accompanying social and ecological
measures or technical adjustments, and in particular with-
out sufficient consideration of the interests of persons to
be resettled, than would likely have been the case had
international donors been involved.
Mechanisms for finding consensus on large dams have
been developed
The main challenge is to find a consensus over future
large dams, one that does justice to all parties concerned.
The World Commission on Dams, which was founded in
1997 and provides a forum for cooperation between gov-
ernments, international donors, the private sector, and
NGOs, offers a useful framework for such consensus-
building. Many projects - such as the large-scale dams on
the Mekong River that have been planned since the 1950s
- may in this way be discarded once and for all. Reason-
able dam projects, on the other hand, may – with adequate
compensation for unavoidable negative impacts - be built
in the public interest and once again enjoy the support of
Western donors.
A small reduction of irrigation would release substan-
tial amounts of water for other purposes
Due to rising urban water needs, many regions are consid-
ering restricting water used for irrigated agriculture in
favour of the urban centers. This can be accomplished by
increasing irrigation efficiency, raising irrigation tariffs or
buying water rights from farmers. In many cases irrigated
land is located in the vicinity of rapidly growing urban
centers. Abandoning one single hectare of irrigated land,
which, in developing countries, typically feeds one family,
makes enough water available to supply roughly 200 city
dwellers. As an alternative it would be possible to intro-
duce water-saving irrigation techniques, without impairing
either production or employment in agriculture. Surveys
show that urban water consumers, who suffer frequent
supply failures or are not even connected to the supply
network, are willing to pay higher prices for a better water
supply. Farmers can be compensated adequately for their
Renewable water resources* in millions of m3 per capita
and year in selected countries (1995)
Kuwait 103
Jordan 200
Singapore 211
Israel 382
Egypt 923
South Africa 1,206
United Kingdom 1,219
Germany 2,096
India 2,228
China 2,292
Nigeria 2,506
USA 9,413
Indonesia 12,804
Brazil 42,957
Canada 98,462
Global median 7,176
* Renewable water resources do not include direct
precipitation, fossil groundwater, or desalinated sea
water. Rain-fed farming (as opposed to irrigation)
covers its water needs from direct precipitation,
which is not included in the figures cited above. The
substantial and highly significant fluctuations between
individual regions within countries are also not con-
sidered. The above figures should be interpreted
taken these caveats into account.
Source: World Resources Institute, World Resources
1996-97, Washington 1997
3water rights, as has been demonstrated in the arid regions
of Chile and the US. In most developing countries, how-
ever, political resistance and the lack of a legal framework
present obstacles to the emergence of such water markets.
High potential for savings in the use of water in agri-
culture, industry, and households is not fully utilized
Apart from the influence of agricultural policy on water
consumption, new technologies offer the prospect of sub-
stantial technology-related water savings in irrigated agri-
culture. By introducing drip irrigation, for example, it is
possible to save up to half of the water otherwise used. In
industry modern processes can reduce the amount of water
needed for cooling, cleaning, or production processes by
as much as 90 %. Households, too, offer substantial sav-
ings potentials. This is true above all for toilets, showers,
and washing machines, which presently, even in the cities
of many developing countries, account for a considerable
share of water consumption. Furthermore, losses due to
leaks in the distribution network could be reduced consid-
erably.
In these cases water is, in economic terms, replaced by
capital or energy. The fact that this substitution seldom
takes place is, among other things, due to low and subsi-
dized water tariffs that are the norm throughout the devel-
oping world. Raising water charges would constitute an
effective incentive to save water and release it for other
purposes. This could be used to meet a good part of the
drinking-water needs of a growing population and work
indirectly toward the goal of defusing water conflicts.
The urban poor often pay high prices to water ven-
dors
Most of the poor in developing countries have no access
to piped water. In rural areas these people for the most
part spend considerable time and effort carrying water
from wells and rivers or collecting rainwater. But it is also
estimated that every fourth city dweller in developing
countries is not connected to the water supply and is thus
forced to rely on standpipes taps or water vendors. Water
vendors, who transport their precious ware on trucks or
donkey-carts, often demand ten or indeed a hundred times
the price of urban water tariffs. And for the most part they
do not even make high profits in doing so, since they
themselves are faced with high costs for transporting clean
water over large distances. In some cases there may also
be a water price charged at the "source" by private well
owners. The urban poor not infrequently pay out over a
tenth of their income to water vendors. The households
connected to the water supply often pay the same amount,
but they receive a great deal more water for their money
and their water bill accounts for a smaller share of their
income.
Urban water utilities in developing countries are for
the most part financially exhausted
Water utilities in developing countries are at present often
financially exhausted because of low water tariffs. On the
average water charges cover less than a third of the real
costs of processing and distributing water and disposing
of waste water. The water utilities seldom impose a charge
for water abstraction, even when water is extremely scarce
and excessive abstraction is detrimental to the environ-
ment. Necessary maintenance work is not carried out, the
result being frequent supply failures. If the water utilities
are to expand their supply networks, they are dependent
on government subsidies and loans, which, however, as a
rule prove inadequate. Higher water charges could help
here: in this way it would be possible to improve mainte-
nance and reduce network losses. Furthermore, a higher
self-financing ratio would make it possible to mobilize
more external funds for a rapid expansion of the supply
network.
Higher water charges can be equitable
Poor households can be helped by means of progressive
water tariffs, which are widespread in developing coun-
tries: When consumption is high, the price per cubic meter
usually comes close to covering costs, while basic con-
sumption remains subsidized. For poor extended families
it could prove possible to grant targeted income supports
or small loans to help pay for the often high connection
fees. It would also be possible to exempt the standpipes
that are used mainly by the poor from progressive water
tariffs. Bearing these aspects in mind, it is possible to
design water tariffs in an equitable manner. Progressive
rates are tantamount to cross-subsidization: big users pay
higher charges, while small consumers pay lower fees.
Since better-off families as a rule consume more water,
they in this way subsidize the supply to poorer households
with their lower consumption levels. An approach of this
sort usually makes more sense than any attempt to imple-
ment across-the-board subsidies in the form of low linear
charges entailing one rate per cubic meter no matter how
much water is in fact consumed, an approach that disre-
gards the poor who are not connected to the water supply.
Private-sector involvement in the supply of drinking
water makes sense...
At the same time as water tariffs are raised it is imperative
to increase the efficiency of public water utilities, which
are often poorly equipped and staffed by poorly paid
personnel that are usually not particularly motivated,
insufficiently qualified and inadequately trained. It is here
that the private sector can provide a substantial contribu-
tion if it is offered sufficient incentives to invest. Exam-
ples of privately operated urban water utilities in devel-
oping countries - such as Abidjan and Buenos Aires -
show that these utilities have lower distribution losses,
higher billing efficiency, and higher levels of customer
satisfaction than their public-sector counterparts.
...and need not necessarily mean reduced government
intervention potentials
In these cases the state has not at all disappeared from the
picture. It continues to monitor the charges and the quality
of service delivery. Once a stipulated period of time has
elapsed, the government can transfer the concession to
another firm or it can take over operations again. Thus far,
however, this case has not occurred. The problem is in-
stead that the interest of the private sector in investing in
the water sector in developing countries tends to be lim-
ited compared to the energy sector or telecommunications.
Among the reasons for this are that returns on capital are
typically lower and capital is tied up for long periods, as
well as the problem of low water charges and the risk of
government intervention. In the framework of develop-
4ment cooperation it would be possible to encourage pri-
vate-sector willingness to invest in urban water utilities by
providing partial guarantees and low-interest loans. If this
proved successful, a limited amount of public funds could
be used to provide a broadly effective and sustainable
contribution to meeting basic needs and reducing poverty.
Wars over water are unlikely in the foreseeable future
On the whole it is evident that there are considerable
possibilities available to make more efficient use of the
scarce good water, and hence the question is whether
water scarcity will in fact lead to "water wars".
Certainly water played a part in some wars fought in the
past. The best-known example is the conflict over the
diversion of the sources of the Jordan River in the period
preceding the Six-Day War of 1967. Other possible thea-
ters of future water wars are seen along the Jordan, the
Tigris and Euphrates, and the Indus rivers. The fact is,
though, that these examples are all regions with histori-
cally deep-seated conflicts that emerged independently of
water conflicts and continue to exist. In the 1950s, there
were sharp clashes between Pakistan and India over the
waters of the Indus; today, in spite of distinctly higher
demand for water, this issue plays no more than a subor-
dinate role. Tensions between Turkey and Syria were
kindled by Syria's support for the Kurdish Workers' Party,
PKK; despite higher water consumption the water issue,
on which earlier conflicts centered, is no longer an acute
one between these two countries. Egyptian President
Sadat threatened in the 1970s to bomb any dam construc-
tion sites on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia; today, in an effort
supported by the United Nations Development Program
and the World Bank, the two sides are talking together
and with the eight other Nile riparians about exploring
projects based on sharing the Nile for their mutual benefit.
It can of course not be ruled out that the water issue will
again become a source of conflict. It should, however, not
be forgotten here that water scarcity is invariably only one
facet, and not the actual cause, of conflicts.
There are numerous examples of successful coopera-
tion on transboundary rivers
Transboundary rivers can be managed to the mutual bene-
fit of the parties concerned when there is a political will to
do so. Dams on the upper course of a river can benefit
countries on the lower course by preventing flooding and
storing water for the dry season. In the most favourable
case downstream riparians are involved in dam manage-
ment on the upper course by participating in joint com-
missions. Should this not be feasible, it is possible to
stipulate water shares in international agreements, as was
the case, for instance, in the 1959 agreement between
Egypt and Sudan. Despite persistent conflicts including
threats of war between the two countries, as last occurred
in 1995, this agreement has always been respected. An-
other possibility is to assign individual rivers wholly to
one country, as in the case of the Indo-Pakistani Indus
accord of 1960. The International Convention on the Non-
navigational Use of International Watercourses, which
was adopted by the United Nations in 1997 and is pres-
ently awaiting ratification, offers an international legal
framework for such agreements.
It would, however, be far more important for any coop-
eration in using transboundary rivers to defuse regional
political conflicts - such, for instance, as the Kurdish
question in the area of the Tigris and Euphrates - and to
create mutual interdependencies in other areas such as
power supplies or regional trade. When a conflict over
water threatens to damage good relations in other areas,
the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict is far lower
than when the countries concerned are linked by nothing
other than the geographic coincidence of the course of a
river.
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